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Table 7 Fees models

From: Does increased provider effort improve quality of care? Evidence from a standardised patient study on correct and unnecessary treatment

 

Total fee (n = 452)

Consultation fee (n = 426)

Labs fee (n = 447)

Drugs fee (n = 426)

Base model

    

IRT effort

0.51 (0.18–0.55), p = 0.003

0.37 (0.18–0.55), p < 0.001

0.06 (-0.03–0.14), p = 0.180

0.08 (-0.19–0.34), p = 0.563

Base model + provider characteristics

    

IRT effort

0.36 (0.04–0.68), p = 0.027

0.24 (0.07–0.41), p = 0.006

0.05 (-0.03–0.14), p = 0.209

0.07 (-0.19–0.34), p = 0.591

Female provider

-0.29 (-0.98–0.40), p = 0.408

0.16 (-0.20–0.53), p = 0.376

-0.03 (-0.22–0.15), p = 0.708

-0.45 (-1.02–0.12), p = 0.122 = 1

Bonus (vs fixed salary)

2.09 (1.34–2.84), p < 0.001

0.78 (0.39–1.17), p < 0.001

0.35 (0.16–0.55), p < 0.001

0.96 (0.35–1.57), p = 0.002

% of 3 most qualified clinicians who are doctors

4.31 (2.63–5.99), p < 0.001

3.90 (3.03–4.77) p < 0.001

-0.02 (-0.47–0.42), p = 0.917

0.25 (-1.12–1.62), p = 0.4716

Base model + provider characteristics + facility characteristics

    

IRT effort

0.30 (-0.01–0.62), p = 0.057

0.15 (-0.10–0.32), p = 0.066

0.05 (-0.04–0.14), p = 0.267

0.11 (-0.15–0.38), p = 0.403

Female provider

-0.07 (-0.74–0.60) p = 0.844

0.25 (-0.10–0.60), p = 0.162

-0.03 (-0.22–0.15), p = 0.717

-0.34 (-0.90–0.23), p = 0.244

Bonus (vs fixed salary)

1.50 (0.74–2.26), p < 0.001

0.45 (0.06–0.84), p = 0.024

0.32 (0.11–0.52), p = 0.003

0.71 (0.07–1.34), p = 0.029

% of 3 most qualified clinicians who are doctors

3.18 (1.47–4.90), < 0.001

3.28 (2.39–4.16), p < 0.001

-0.13 (-0.60–0.34), p = 0.659

-0.20 (-1.63–1.23), p = 0.782

Hospital (vs dispensary)

1.29 (0.34–2.24), 0.008

1.14 (0.64–01.64), p < 0.001

0.09 (-0.18–0.35), p = 0.517

-0.09 (-0.72–0.89), p = 0.834

Health centre (vs dispensary)

0.58 (-0.16–1.31), 0.122

0.53 (0.14–0.92), p = 0.008

0.22 (0.01–0.42), p = 0.035

0.01 (-0.62–0.63), p = 0.834

For-profit (vs not-for-profit)

1.68 (0.90–2.45), p < 0.001

0.74 (0.33–1.15), p < 0.001

0.16 (-0.05–0.37), p = 0.136

0.95 (0.29–1.61), p = 0.005

Peri-urban (vs rural)

0.25 (-0.53–1.03), p = 0.529

-0.10 (-0.51–0.31), p = 0.626

0.01 (-0.20–0.23), p = 0.894

0.42 (-0.23–1.08), p = 0.206

Urban (vs rural)

1.05 (0.26–1.84), p = 0.010

0.54 (0.13–0.95), p = 0.010

0.03 (-0.18–0.25), p = 0.771

0.47 (-0.20–1.13), p = 0.167

Any insurance revenue

0.29 (-0.42–1.00), p = 0.420

0.42 (0.04–0.79), p = 0.029

-0.01 (-0.21–0.18), p = 0.902

-0.10 (-0.70–0.50), p = 0.750

  1. Coefficients are from linear regression models. Base model includes adjustment for SP fixed effects, SP case and SafeCare intervention arm