Game (round) | Intervention | Group (n), decision |
|---|
| | | Run 1 | Run 2 |
|---|
Price magnitudea | 100,000 $ = 1 US$ | 100,000 $ = 1 US$ | 1 $ = 1 US$ |
|---|
| | Group 1 | Group 2 | Group 3 | Group 4 | Group 5 | Group 6 |
|---|
Game 1 (round 1 to 5) | Role | Regulator (100), WTP | Seller (101), WTA | Regulator (97), WTP | Seller (101), WTA | Regulator (105), WTP | Seller (101), WTA |
| | | Role reversal (within-subject) | No role reversal |
Game 2 (round 1 to 5) | Role | Seller (100), WTA | Regulator (101), WTP | Price offers (not covered in this publication) |
- In both runs, participants played the same five rounds in two consecutive games. All relevant information about the consequences of the negotiation were provided before the first game. Participants did not know which rounds would be relevant for final payoffs, nor that the game would be repeated after five rounds
- Run one: four rounds voluntary training before first five rounds (initial role only) taken by n = 92 participants for group 1 (Regulator) and n = 93 for group 2 (Seller). One participant removed in run one due to age not meeting inclusion criteria. No participants removed for run two
- Run two: New subjects recruited. Adjustments: introductory training mandatory for all participants; additional bonus for deciders if price offer facilitates an agreement (game 2, not covered in this publication); additional message displayed below decision table if price entered would lead to a not strictly monotone preference statement (“you did not increase your price while the patient outcome of the product increased. Does this truly reflect your preference?”); four comprehension questions (three to pass, one to filter) and one attention screening question in between to identify inattentive responders
- Table adapted from Wettstein/Boes 2020 [33]
- WTP willingness to pay, WTA willingness to accept
- aGame currency converted to real payoff at the end of the experiment
