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Table 5 Factors associated with the proportion of significant effect sizes

From: Is the evidence on the effectiveness of pay for performance schemes in healthcare changing? Evidence from a meta-regression analysis

 

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Average Marginal Effect (AME)

Sample mean

Average Marginal Effect (AME)

Sample mean

Average Marginal Effect (AME)

Sample mean

New studies (August 2015-Feb 2018)

0.11 (0.13)

0.32 (0.47)

0.06 (0.17)

0.30 (0.46)

0.05 (0.16)

0.26 (0.44)

Research design

 Difference in Differences (DID)

−0.20** (0.08)

0.43 (0.50)

−0.20** (0.10)

0.44 (0.50)

− 0.24** (0.10)

0.52 (0.51)

 Interrupted Time Series (ITS)

−0.09 (0.10)

0.12 (0.33)

−0.11 (0.11)

0.13 (0.34)

−0.67*** (0.08)

0.09 (0.30)

 Randomized Control Trial (RCT)

−0.19* (0.10)

0.41 (0.49)

−0.20* (0.11)

0.10 (0.30)

−0.34*** (0.12)

0.14 (0.35)

Country

 US

−0.11* (0.07)

0.41 (0.49)

−0.13* (0.07)

0.41 (0.49)

0.08 (0.11)

0.40 (0.50)

Setting

 Hospital

0.06 (0.06)

0.30 (0.46)

0.05 (0.07)

0.32 (0.47)

−0.24** (0.09)

0.33 (0.48)

Incentive Schemes

 Cost and quality

0.11* (0.06)

0.25 (0.43)

0.13* (0.08)

0.25 (0.44)

−0.34*** (0.08)

0.21 (0.41)

Rewards for improvement

−0.12* (0.07)

0.36 (0.48)

−0.12* (0.07)

0.38 (0.49)

−0.09 (0.06)

0.36 (0.49)

Use of incentives

 Discretionary use

  

0.01 (0.09)

0.55 (0.50)

  

 Special use

  

0.08 (0.12)

0.06 (0.25)

  

 Size of payment to revenue ratio (%)

    

0.01* (0.00)

11.53 (9.18)

 Publication year fixed effects

Yes

 

Yes

 

Yes

 

 Number of observations

116

 

109

 

42

 

 Number of clusters

62

 

57

 

25

 

 Average number of observations per cluster

1.9

 

1.9

 

1.7

 

 (Min-Max)

(1–15)

 

(1–14)

 

(1–4)

 

 Pseudo-Log

−59.91

 

−55.66

 

−16.99

 

 AIC

1.33

 

1.37

 

1.57

 

 BIC

− 408.42

 

−365.18

 

− 84.57

 
  1. Note: The omitted reference group for “Research Design” is before and after designs, controlled before and after, and case-control studies. The omitted reference group for “Country” is all other countries. The omitted reference group for “Setting” is primary care. The Omitted reference group for “Incentive schemes” is to pay for performance only. The omitted reference group for “Rewards for improvement” is not rewarding for improvement. The Omitted reference group for “Use of incentives” is using incentives for physician income. The standard errors are clustered in the scheme level and are in the parenthesis
  2. p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01
  3. AIC Akaike information criterion
  4. BIC Bayesian information criterion