Whether high government subsidies reduce the healthcare provision of township healthcare centers in rural China

Table 3 Result of fixed effect model

	log (medical revenue)	log (outpatient visit)	log (total occupy beds of inpatient)	log (surgery revenue)	log (sickbed utilization rate)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Subsidy percentage	− 0.024^***	− 0.013^***	− 0.026^***	− 0.014^***	− 0.018^***
	(< 0.001)	(< 0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Type of THCs [C220]	−0.022	− 0.002	0.074	0.071	− 0.038
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.109)	(0.226)	(0.068)
Number of Physician	0.005^***	0.005^***	0.005^**	0.011^**	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Number of authorized bed	0.006^***	0.005^***	0.034^***	0.018^***	−0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.002)
Separation revenue policy	−0.054^***	−0.085^***	− 0.228^***	−0.290^**	− 0.108^***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.061)	(0.128)	(0.039)
Individual effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time effect	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	10,791	10,791	10,791	10,791	10,791
R²	0.264	0.097	0.063	0.006	0.052
Adjusted R²	0.171	−0.018	−0.055	−0.120	−0.068
F Statistic (df = 5; 9579)	688.720^***	204.784^***	129.574^***	10.739^***	105.410^***

Note: ^***p < 0.01; ^**p < 0.05;^* p < 0.1
p value of Hausman Test is < 0.05, which indicates that fixed effect model is better

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