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Table 5 Results of linear regression models predicting 2008 Levels of Privatization by Party in Power in Brazilian Municipalitiesa

From: Do elections matter for private-sector healthcare management in Brazil? An analysis of municipal health policy

  Dental X-rays Ultrasounds Hospital Beds Outsourcing Health Expenditures
Incumbency −0.27 −0.35 0.85 −0.85 −0.46 0.02.
(0.42) (0.86) (1.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
HDI 0.19** 0.23. 0.62*** −0.07 0.16*** 0.79***
(0.06) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.04) (0.14)
Upper middle class income 0.09*** 0.08** 0.06. 0.06* 0.04*** −0.16***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Controls for Baseline and Aggregate Changec
 Total Equipment per capita end of term 0.92*** 4.89*** 8.85*** 0.13***   
(0.11) (0.30) (0.87) (0.03)   
 Total Equipment per capita baseline −0.78*** −4.73*** −10.37*** −0.07*   
(0.11) (0.29) (0.85) (0.03)   
 % Private Equipment 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.72*** 0.80***   
 Interquartile Range 0.20 0.67 0.73 0.47   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
 Outsourcing/Health Expenditures      0.44***  
     (0.01)  
 Health Expenditures per capita       0.70***
      (0.01)
R2 Full model 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.47 0.60
R2 Political variables only 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01
Num. obs. 3420 2840 1988 2998 4480 4534
  1. a*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, · p < 0.1. Entries are regression coefficients (standard errors). Note: Incumbency estimates are multiplied by 100
  2. bDue to limitations in data availability, 2005 baseline values were used for x-rays, ultrasounds, and hospital beds, 2006 values for dental equipment, and 2004 values for outsourcing and health expenditures
  3. cEstimates for total equipment per capita at end of term and baseline should be considered together. When combined, their sum equals the effect size for the change in the total stock of equipment over the mayoral term